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2 
THE ROLE OF FAULT IN DEFENSIVE KILLING 
Adam Betz 
This paper deals with the conditions of liability to self-defense. When I use the term 
liability, I mean moral liability. This is different from desert. If I am liable to be killed in self-
defense, it does not follow that I deserve to be killed (say, as a means of punishment). In short, 
. desert entails liability but liability does not entail desert. 1 My use of the term in this paper may 
be stated succinctly as follows: if killing a person will neither wrong him nor violate his rights, 
he is morally liable to be killed. A person poses an unjust threat when he threatens harms that 
are neither justified nor excused. A person is culpable for an unjust threat ifhe intends the threat 
he poses, is a morally responsible agent, and there are no mitigating circumstances, such as 
duress, that excuse his actions. A person is atfault, but not culpable, for an unjust threat if he is 
a morally responsible agent, has acted unretlectively, recklessly, though not maliciously, in a 
way that poses risks to others. Though culpability entails fault, fault does not entail culpability; 
as I will explain later, a person does not have to be culpable in order to be at fault for an unjust 
threat.2 
According to Judith Thomson, culpability is not relevant to determining whether a person 
is liable to be killed in self-defense. According to Jeff McMahan, culpability and fault are 
relevant factors in justified self-defense, but neither condition is necessary. On my view, 
culpability is not a necessary condition for liability, but fault is. In support of this thesis, I will 
present and criticize both Thomson and McMahan's views of liability to defensive action. 
1 I am here following a distinction made by Jeff McMahan in "The Basis ofMoral Liability to Defensive Killing" p. 
386.
 




Because they state that fault is not necessary for liability, these theories have counterintuitive 
results. In short, I hope to show that these theories are too liberal and we should therefore 
embrace fault as a necessary condition of liability. 
Before turning to my criticisms of Thomson and McMahan, I will sketch my preferred 
account of self-defense, which is a version of McMahan's account. It is the Justice-Based 
Account of the right of self-defense, which, quoting McMahan "treats the morality of self-
defense as a matter of justice in the distribution of harms.,,3 For instance, a culpable attacker is 
liable to defensive action because he voluntarily created a situation in which someone must be 
harmed. The culpable attacker could have avoided this situation, so it is permissible, as a matter 
of justice, for him to be forced to suffer the costs of his own actions rather than imposing them 
on someone who is innocent4 (assuming that the defensive action is necessary and 
proportionate). To put the point in different terms, there is an asymmetry between the Attacker 
and the Victim deriving from the attacker's culpability; he alone is responsible for the fact that 
someone must suffer harm, so he is liable to self-defensive action. 
The Justice-Based account of self-defense is given strong support by a hypothetical 
example developed by McMahan. I quote his example at length: 
Suppose... that a mine shaft has collapsed, leaving two miners trapped in a small open 
space. A radio communication has informed them that rescuers will reach them in five 
hours, but their instruments indicate that, while there is enough oxygen to allow one of 
them to survive for more than five hours, their oxygen supply will be depleted within 
three hours if both continue to breathe. Suppose further that one of the miners (call 
him the "innocent miner") then learns two facts: first, that the other miner (the "culpable 
miner") deliberately engineered the collapse of the shaft in an effort to kill him and, 
second, that the culpable miner has a small oxy~en tank that will allow him to survive for 
two hours after the oxygen in the shaft runs out. 
3 The Ethics ofKilling p. 402 
4 Ibid p. 402 and "Self-Defense and the Innocent Attacker" pp. 256-63 
5 "Self-Defense the Innocent Attacker" p. 258 
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Intuitively, it seems permissible for the innocent miner to kill the culpable miner (the Culpable 
Cause) in self-preservation. The culpable miner does not presently pose a threat to the innocent 
miner, so in that respect he is also a Bystander. However, his culpable past action caused the 
present situation in which someone must be harmed. The .only difference between a culpable 
attacker and a culpable cause is that the culpable attacker's action lies in the present whereas the 
culpable miner's action lies in the past. This difference seems to be morally insignificant. The 
Justice-Based Account implies the permissibility of killing a person in self-preservation whose 
culpable past action causes a present threat to one's life (once again, subject to the requirements 
ofnecessity and proportionality). This is a merit of the account. 
On McMahan's analysis of the Justice-Based Account, other conditions besides 
culpability can ground the right of self-defense. A person does not necessarily have to be 
culpable to lower the moral barriers against harming him. On his analysis, which he calls the 
Responsibility Account, culpability is an important factor in justified self-defense, though not a 
necessary condition for liability. He contrasts this with what he calls the Culpability Account. 
According to the Culpability Account, culpability i~ a necessary condition for liability to 
defensive action. My preferred view of the Justice-Based Account departs from McMahan's in 
that I maintain that a stricter condition of liability is necessary for justified self-defense. I will 
return to McMahan's conditions of liability later, but for now I tum to Thomson's account, 
which states that culpability has no bearing on whether a Victim may kill in self-defense. 
Thomson offers a rights-based approach to the ethics of killing in self-defense. She 
distinguishes among three cases: (1) A Villainous Aggressor (which is the same as what I call a 
culpable attacker) who culpably tries to harm you. Thomson's example is a villainous truck 
driver trying to run you down. (2) An Innocent Aggressor (or as I call it, an innocent attacker), is 
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an attacker who is not a villain but for reasons beyond his control, nonetheless aggresses against 
you. Thomson's example is a temporarily psychotic truck driver trying to run you down. (3) 
What Thomson calls an Innocent Threat is the same as the nonresponsible threat defined in the 
appendix. Thomson's example of a nonresponsible threat is a fat man whose body is blown off a 
cliff by a gust of wind and hurled at another person with lethal force.6 Almost everyone will 
agree that a Victim may kill the Villainous Aggressor in self-defense. However, by Thomson's 
own admission, many people are reluctant to conclude that it is permissible to kill 
nonresponsible threats in self-defense. She argues that this view is mistaken. 
Thomson's project is to find a morally relevant property that is held in common among a 
culpable attacker, an innocent attacker, and a nonresponsible threat-that is, something that is 
true of each case which makes killing in self-defense permissible. The property she identifies is 
this: It is true in each case that if you do not kill them, they will kill you. Because you are not 
morally liable to be killed, these aggressions and threats are, by definition, impermissible. She 
claims that you therefore have rights against them that they not kill you. "What makes it 
permissible for you to kill the two drivers and the fat man," according to Thomson, "is the fact 
that they will otherwise violate your rights that they not kill you, and therefore lack rights that 
you not kill them.,,7 What is important on her account is that the culpable attacker, innocent 
attacker, and nonresponsible threat, by threatening to kill you unjustly, thereby threaten your 
right against them that they not kill you and so forfeit their right not to be killed. The fact that 
these attackers and threats lack a right not to be killed, and the Victim retains such a right, makes 
self-defense permissible in each case. 
6 For purposes of clarity I will use the terms 'culpable attacker,' 'innocent attacker,' and 'nonresponsible threat' in 
flace of Thomson's terminology. 
"Self-Defense" p. 302 
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Thomson believes that culpability is irrelevant to the permissibility of killing in self-
defense: culpable attackers, innocent attackers, and nonresponsible threats are morally on a par.s 
Thomson thinks it is clear "that if the aggressor [or nonresponsible threat] will (certainly) take 
your life unless you kill him, then his being or not being [culpable] for his aggression is 
irrelevant to the question whether you may kill him.,,9 In short, what makes self-defense 
permissible on Thomson's account is not the fact that the person is blameworthy or is aggressing 
against the Victim, but simply the fact that his actions or mere movements or presence qua 
physical object-morally responsible or not--ereate aforced choice among lives (see glossary). 
I think there is a fatal flaw in Thomson's view since she dismisses culpability as a 
relevant factor in justified self-defense. I will return to this worry later. For now I will address 
Thomson's claim that nonresponsible threats violate a Victim's right not to be killed. I argue 
that this claim is false. It is true of nonresponsible threats that they will kill the Victim if she 
does not kill them. But it does not follow that nonresponsible threats violate any right of the 
Victim's. Rights are constraints against the actions of morally responsible agents. Thomson 
agrees. Thomson has claimed elsewhere that for a pers9n to have a right against me is for me to 
be under a behavioral constraint---or, alternatively, for me to have a duty not to behave a certain 
way toward that person.10 It would be ludicrous to say, for instance, that a falling boulder 
violates your right not to be killed. Nonresponsible threats are, by definition, not morally 
responsible for the threat they pose. However, in her article "Self-Defense," Thomson explicitly 
denies that responsible agency is necessary for the violation of a right. Thus she says, "I think 
8 Thomson's use of the tenn 'fault' is synonymous with my use of the ternl 'culpability.' I use the tenn fault in a 
way that does not imply culpability. Again, for purposes of clarity, I will use the tenn culpability where Thomson 
uses the tenn fault. 
9 Ibid p. 286 
10 Thomson, The Realm ofRights p. 77. 
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there are good reasons in general to say that agency is no more required for violating a right than 
fault is.,,ll Hence, Thomson's account of self-defense is inconsistent with her theory of rights. 
Suppose we accept the thread ofThomson's view that claims that agency is not necessary 
for rights violations. If we are willing to say that agency is not necessary for rights violations, 
we will spill into some absurd implications. Surely we do not want to say, and Thomson does 
not want to say, that things that are incapable of any agency are potential violators of rights. A 
plummeting boulder is not an agent, but it will surely kill you if it lands on you. It is ridiculous 
to suppose that the boulder therefore violates your right not to be killed. But the falling fat man 
is in the same position qua physical object as a falling boulder. There are undoubtedly great 
differences between the two--namely, that it would be of moral consequence to kill the former 
and innocuous to destroy the latter, other things being equal. But can it seriously be thought that 
a falling boulder, because it will kill you, therefore violates your right not to be killed? Does it 
even make sense to say that you've got rights against boulders that they not fall on you? This is 
quite a stretch. But in terms of the threat posed to your life, it is difficult to see why a falling fat 
man but not a boulder could be a potential rights-violator. 12 If we are in agreement about this 
point, we ought to acknowledge that responsible agency is necessary for a rights violation. And 
as already indicated, Thomson has endorsed this view elsewhere. 
Frances Kamm has attempted to address this objection by showing that there is a 
difference between a falling boulder, on the one hand, and a Nonresponsible Threat like 
Thomson's fat man, on the other. The fat man unlike the boulder "is in a position where [he] 
II "Self-Defense" p. 302 
12 I arrived at these points independently, but they are further elucidated in McMahan's "Self-Defense and the 
Innocent Attacker" pp. 275-6, and Otsuka's "Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense" p. 80 
8
 
should not be first.,,13 In other words, contrary to what I have said, the fat man is at least to some 
degree responsible for the threat he poses. According to Kamm, 
The position of this [threat] is different from that of a natural object... because [he] is 
not a stone but, rather, a person who should not be in an inappropriate position relative to 
others. One person's inappropriate location vis-a-vis another raises moral questions no 
matter how it comes about, whereas the unfortunate location of objects does not. 14 
This response is counterintuitive. It is unclear why the position of the Nonresponsible Threat, 
unlike a natural object, raises the moral questions Kamm supposes. From what I can tell, 
Kamm's passage is an ad hoc stipulation. For if the fat man lacks responsible agency for the 
threat he poses, then it is difficult to see how his position relative to another person is morally 
inappropriate. Michael Otsuka interprets Kamm to mean that people, unlike natural objects, are 
able to take precautions to prevent themselves from becoming Threats, and that is how the body 
of a Threat can be in an inappropriate location vis-A-vis another. 15 If this is the case, then on 
Thonlson's view, the fat man is a potential rights-violator, but a falling boulder is not. 
I remain dubious as to the prospects of the Rights-Based Account, even with Kamm's 
revision. Strictly speaking, there is always a remote possibility that I will be swept away by a 
gust of wind, and then hurled at another person. How is this possibility grounds for liability to 
defensive action? Let me try to flesh out what I think is the most plausible way a proponent of 
Kamm's view might answer this question. Kamm might say that the fat man knew when he 
decided to leave the house that there was a possibility-albeit a slim one--that he would be 
transfonned into a lethal human projectile. Since the fat man could foresee this possibility, he 
assumes some degree of moral responsibility when he goes for his picnic by the cliff. Engaging 
in nonnal activities that nonetheless carry a remote possibility of threatening others would be, on 
13 Kamm, Creation and Abortion p. 47 
14 Ibid, p. 47 
15 "Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense" p. 81 
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the argument I am attributing to Kamm, adequate grounds for moral responsibility and therefore 
for liability to defensive action. 
But even this line of argument is extraordinarily implausible. It is difficult to believe that 
I assume a tacit liability to defensive action when I engage in the normal activities of everyday 
life, such as simply leaving the house. In addition, it does not seem that the fat man's failure to 
fend off a cyclone makes him liable to attack when he is hurled at a Bystander. Many of our 
normal, everyday activities have the potential to cause harm to others. Indeed, there is a remote 
possibility that if I leave the house I will be kidnapped, knocked unconscious, and hurled at a 
Bystander with lethal force. 
I will nonetheless grant Kamm's (liberal) conditions of moral responsibility for the sake 
of argument. If seemingly innocuous activities like enjoying a picnic lunch near a precipice can 
ground moral responsibility and therefore liability, let us suppose instead that the fat man is an 
extremely cautious recluse who avoids the (allegedly) risk-imposing activities of everyday life. 
He keeps his house locked up at all hours and never leaves for fear that his body might be 
transformed into a human projectile. Despite the fat man's obsessive precautions, a villain 
manages to break into the fat man's house, knock him unconscious, and hurl him off the cliff 
toward a Bystander. In this case, the fat man took every precaution possible to prevent himself 
from becoming a lethal human projectile. So no conditions ofmoral responsibility seem to apply 
to him for his status as a threat. In terms of the threat he poses, the plummeting fat man is like 
the falling boulder. He does not violate the Victim's right just because he falls on her, for 
responsible agency is a necessary condition for rights-violations. Kamm's theory does not draw 
a principled distinction between the boulder and the fat man in this case, and it is difficult to see 
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how one might be drawn. Thus, from the fact that a passive threat like Thomson's fat man will 
kill you unjustly, it does not follow that he will violate any right of yours not to be killed. 
In addition to these problems, Thomson's view is not equipped to deal with the case of 
the culpable cause discussed earlier. 16 Thomson might say that the culpable miner's past action 
will cause the violation of the innocent miner's right not to be killed. However, since Thomson 
holds that culpability is irrelevant to permissibility, her account has extreme implications. For 
instance, suppose that the miner who causes the collapse is not culpable for that action. Perhaps 
he inadvertently engineered the collapse while attempting to save the lives of other miners, 
making him a Justified Cause. According to Thomson's view, the justified past actions of the 
Justified Cause will violate the rights of the innocent miner, so the innocent miner may kill the 
Justified Cause in self-preservation. But since the Justified Cause is a Bystander, Thomson's 
account implies that killing Bystanders is permissible in certain cases-an implication which 
offends against her own theory,17 and is incongruent with common-sense morality. Though 
Thomson's account is an account of self-defense, I think the fact that it fails to satisfactorily 
accommodate cases in which killing in self-preservation seems clearly permissible, we have 
further grounds for doubting the cogency of the rights-based approach. Moreover, the case of 
the culpable cause shows that culpability must play a vital part in any viable account of self-
defense; that Thomson treats culpability as irrelevant I think constitutes a decisive reason to 
reject the Rights-Based Account. 
Thomson is perhaps the most sophisticated exponent of the view that culpability has no 
bearing on the permissibility of self-defense. We have seen, however, that the view that 
16 The subsequent analysis relies heavily on McMahan's argument in "Self-Defense and the Innocent Attacker" pp. 
17 Killing the Justified Miner in self-preservation constitutes a use-of-a-bystander case, which Thomson argues is 




culpability is irrelevant is implausible. On McMahan's account, other conditions besides 
culpability can ground the right of self-defense. A person does not necessarily have to be 
culpable to lower the moral barriers against harming him. On his analysis, which he calls the 
Responsibility Account, culpability is a vital factor in justified self-defense, though not a 
necessary condition for liability. Other theorists have claimed that culpability is a necessary 
condition for liability; this is what McMahan calls the Culpability Account. In contrast to both of 
these accounts, I endorse the view that, while culpability is not necessary for liability, some 
degree of fault is. My view is intermediate between the Responsibility Account and the 
Culpability Account. I have two tasks relevant to establishing this intermediate view. First, I 
will show that there is a less stringent condition of fault that does not entail culpability, thereby 
showing that culpability is not a necessary condition of liability to defensive action. Second, I 
will show that this non-culpable version of fault is itself a necessary condition of liability to 
defensive action. 
Before turning to these considerations, I will again address why culpability is not a 
sufficient condition of liability to defensive action. I8 Consider a paradigm case of justified self­
defense. If an attacker is culpably trying to kill you, a Bystander, it may seem that that is 
sufficient to ground objective justification for killing him in self-defense. It is possible, 
however, that the culpable attacker's action will not succeed. He may change his mind before he 
can carry out his devious intentions. Perhaps his gun is, unbeknownst to him, unloaded. We can 
imagine an even more contrived case in which the culpable attacker has a computer chip lodged 
in his brain which will inhibit his actions before he is able to harm his potential Victim. His 
actions, though culpable, will prove unsuccessful. He will not in fact harm the Victim at all. 
Given what it is reasonable for the potential victim to believe at the time of the attack, we will 
18 Thomson and McMahan both allude to this issue. I hope to put the question to rest. 
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excuse her if she kills the culpable attacker. But her lack ofmorally relevant knowledge does not 
provide justification for her act of killing. 19 Because the attacker does not, as a matter of fact, 
pose a threat, the Victim's actions fail to meet the requirement of necessity and so are not 
objectively justified. (Necessity is, crudely put, the condition that killing in self-defense is the 
last resort.) These possibilities show that culpability is not a sufficient condition of liability to 
self-defense. 
Thus, we must determine instead if culpability is a necessary condition of liability. As 
indicated above, I will try to show that a condition other than culpability can ground liability to 
defensive action and, moreover, that this condition is indeed a necessary condition for liability. 
McMahan's Responsibility Account states that liability is a matter of degree. I agree. 
His conditions of liability, in descending order of stringency, are as follows: 
1) Culpability ("the creation of a forced choice among lives in a way that is neither justified nor 
excused"). 
2) Fault without culpability ("the creation of a forced choice among lives by a responsible 
individual in a way that is unjustified but excused"). 
3) Responsibility without culpability or fault ("the creation of a forced choice among lives by a 
responsible individual who has not acted impermissibly,,).2o 
According to the Responsibility Account, culpability provides the strongest basis for liability to 
defensive action. It is not, however, a necessary condition of liability. Since I think it is 
plausible to accept McMahan's second condition as grounds for liability, it follows that 
culpability is not a necessary condition of liability to defensive action. Hence the account's 
claim that liability is a matter of degree. Since I reject the Culpability Account's claim that 
culpability is necessary for liability, I tum to the plausibility of the third condition of McMahan's 
Responsibility Account and show that it is too liberal a condition to ground liability. 
19 McMahan "The Basis ofMoral Liability to Defensive Killing" p. 391 
20 The Ethics ofKilling p. 403 
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McMahan's example of condition 3 is paraphrased as follows:
 
Case 1, The Conscientious Driver: This driver is a cautious driver who takes meticulous 
care to maintain the safety of his vehicle. There is nonetheless an inadvertent brake and 
steering failure that causes his car to careen off the road toward a Bystander. 
The car now poses a lethal threat to the Bystander. According to McMahan, the reason the 
conscientious driver is liable to defensive action from the Bystander is that he is morally 
responsible for an unjust threat. The driver "satisfies [condition 3] because he is a morally 
responsible agent who has acted voluntarily in a way that foreseeably imposed risks on others 
and now threatens the pedestrian with unjust harm" (emphasis mine).21 
According to McMahan, any defensive action aimed at a person who is neither culpable 
nor at fault is subject to even more stringent requirements of necessity and proportionality than 
those that hold for parties who are culpable or at fault. In addition, the Victim may be required 
to retreat from the scene or divide the burden with the driver, if possible. But if killing is 
necessary and proportionate, then the Victim may kill the conscientious driver in self-defense. It 
seems counterintuitive that the conscientious driver is liable to self-defense, but McMahan offers 
an explanation. The point is that the driver chose to go out driving in several tons of potentially 
life-threatening steel. Fatal car accidents are a foreseeable consequence of driving. Though 
driving around is generally an innocuous activity, the conscientious driver loses his full moral 
immunity for two reasons. For one, he lacks sufficient positive moral reasons for driving. 
Presumably, he is driving for one of the typical self-interested reasons for which most people 
drive. Second, though the driver could not know that his driving would cause a forced choice 
among lives given his epistemic limitations, because his act of driving is the direct cause of a 
lethal threat to a Bystander, his act is unjustified. Since the driver chose to engage in this risk-
imposing activity, according to McMahan it is reasonable, as a matter of justice, for him to 
21 "The Basis ofMoral Liability to Defensive Killing," p. 394. 
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assume the costs of his foreseeably dangerous action rather than imposing those costs on the 
Bystander. The conscientious driver does not voluntarily or intentionally pose the threat. 
Rather, he foresaw that some action ofhis might impose risks on others. 
If I am interpreting McMahan correctly, the conscientious driver meets the following two 
requirements presupposed by condition 3 of the Responsibility Account: 1) the foreseeability 
condition and 2) causal responsibility for an unjust threat. I will support my claim that fault is 
necessary for liability by showing that McMahan's third condition of liability-that is, 
responsibility-without-fault-is too liberal. 
There is reason, based on McMahan's own analysis of self-defense against 
nonresponsible threats, to doubt the cogency ofhis third condition of liability. For if people who 
are not in any way at fault can be liable to self-defense just for engaging in the normal activities 
of everyday life, the Responsibility Account seems vulnerable to the same objections 1 earlier 
leveled at Kamm. McMahan acknowledges this problem. He notes that it is difficult to draw a 
principled line between the conscientious driver and, say, an asymptomatic carrier of a flu virus 
that is potentially fatal to young children and the elderly. By hypothesis, many of our 
commonplace activities are potentially risk-imposing, and it seems an overly-stringent demand 
on people that they assume a tacit liability to self-defense just for going about their daily lives. 
As we have seen, eating a picnic lunch by a cliff is potentially risk-imposing. Pushing a 
shopping cart in a crowded parking lot is potentially risk-imposing (I leave the reasons why to 
the imagination of the reader!). Even going for a walk in a crowded area is potentially risk-
imposing. 
Consider the following variation of Thomson's fat man case:
 
Case 2, The Cautious Fat man: This fat man takes the same route to work everyday via a
 




the fat man-who usually walks cautiously-bumps into a fellow pedestrian, trips over 
the curb, and takes a tumble into a (rather wide) open manhole near the construction 
site. He plummets in the direction of a worker inside the tunnel. 
This fat man is all too acutely aware that his body mass could prove potentially lethal to others-
especially when it is inserted into these contrived philosophical examples. Yet he nonetheless 
chooses to walk to work in a densely populated area, near a construction site, hauling several 
hundred pounds of potentially harmful body mass. His transformation to a lethal human 
projectile is a foreseen consequence of his everyday, seemingly benign activity. Moreover, the 
fat man is the direct cause of the threat now facing the tunnel worker. For while the fat man is 
not at fault for bumping into a pedestrian and being veered off course, the fat man is relevantly 
causally involved in bringing about the forced choice among lives. The fat man meets the two 
underlying requirements of McMahan's third condition of liability, foreseeability and causation. 
The fat man is presumably responsible for being fat, responsible for walking in the populated 
area, and is to some extent responsible for bumping into the pedestrian. 
Just as the conscientious driver's car is foreseeably dangerous to others, so is simply 
walking around with an abundance of body mass. In addition, the fat man lacks positive moral 
reasons for walking in the crowded neighborhood. Presumably, he is walking around for the 
typical self-interested reasons for which most people walk around. He could have stayed at 
home and thereby avoided these allegedly risk-imposing activities. Moreover, because the fat 
man's act of walking around has caused a forced choice among lives, his act of walking around 
is objectively unjustified. Or so the Responsibility Account implies. 
Foreseeing that one's body could cause a risk to others when one simply goes about the 
activity of everyday life seems a flimsy basis for liability; so does faultlessly driving a car. But 
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if we accept the Responsibility Account, and its conditions of foreseeability and causation, it 
seems we must accept that the fat man is liable to defensive action as a matter ofjustice. 
My intuition is that he is not liable. This is consistent with the fact that he is not all that 
different from the fat man in Thomson's example. But the fat man in Thomson's example is a 
nonresponsible threat. And according to McMahan's own account, there is no right to kill 
nonresponsible threats in self-defense.22 I agree. However, it is difficult to see what makes the 
fat man in Thomson's example a nonresponsible threat who is not liable, but the fat man in my 
case and the conscientious driver responsible threats who are liable. 
According to McMahan's Responsibility Account, the cautious fat man and the 
conscientious driver, unlike Thomson's fat man, meet condition 3's requirements of 
foreseeability and causation. But unless we know how much foreseeability is necessary, we 
cannot claim that Thomson's fat man is not responsible for a risk-imposing activity. How 
potentially risk-imposing must a person's activities be to ground liability? Thomson's fat man 
could have simply stayed at home behind locked doors in fear that a villain or a tornado would 
tum him into a human projectile. Surely this is unreasonable. Many of our everyday activities 
impose foreseeable risks on others. Given condition 3, where can we draw the line between 
liable and not-liable on the spectrum of cases? I can think ofno such principled line. 
In order to avoid these counterintuitive implications, I suggest that fault should be a 
necessary condition of liability. A person who poses an unjust threat must depart in certain ways 
from normal moral and social life (i.e., he is culpable or malicious, he acts voluntarily in causing 
the forced choice among lives, his actions are negligent, and so on). As already noted, however, 
culpability is not the only sort of fault. My view ofjustified self-defense also treats liability as a 
22 The Ethics ofKilling pp. 401-411. See also Michael Otsuka "Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense" and Nancy 
Davis "Abortion and Self-Defense." 
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matter of degree, though it is not as liberal as McMahan's Responsibility Account. A person can 
be at fault for posing a threat without being culpable, as condition 2 of the Responsibility 
Account states. The distinction in the literature I have read between conditions 2 and 3 of the 
Responsibility Account is unclear. As I understand it, a person is at fault (though not culpable) 
for an attack if he acts voluntarily, unreflectively, and recklessly in a way that poses certain or 
probable risks to innocent persons. Consider the following example: 
Case 3, The Negligent Driver: This driver tends to be forgetful about maintaining 
the safety of his vehicle, which is itself a junk heap. Unhappily, unbeknownst to him, 
his car has some brake and steering problems. While he is out driving, the brakes and 
steering fail and his car is veered off course in the direction of a pedestrian. 
The negligent driver does not drive with any malicious intent to harm others, so he is not 
culpable for the threat he poses to the pedestrian. But it seems intuitively obvious that he is at 
fault for not taking the reasonable precautions to maintain the safety of his vehicle. He ought to 
be aware, given his negligence in maintaining the safety of his vehicle, that there was a greater 
possibility of his act of driving imposing risks on others. The driver is liable to self-defense 
because he should have known, or could have known had he reflected, that since his vehicle was 
not well-maintained, he was engaging in a foreseeably dangerous activity. Because he is at fault 
for driving his poorly-maintained vehicle, there is I think a moral asymmetry between them that 
favors the pedestrian's life over the driver's. The driver has departed in a specific way from the 
norms of ordinary moral and social life: he assumes the responsibility of taking any reasonable 
precautions to maintain the safety of his vehicle, but since he did not, it is permissible, as a 
matter of justice, for the pedestrian to make the negligent driver suffer the costs of his voluntary 
and wrongful action rather than suffering those costs herself In short, the negligent driver 
assumes moral liability for the risk he voluntarily creates. It seems to me that this lesser degree 
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of fault is enough to ground liability to self-defense, even though the driver is not culpable. In 
addition, if I am right that the third condition of the Responsibility Account is too liberal, I think 
there is good reason to conclude that the second condition of McMahan's account is a necessary 
condition of liability. 
I have argued that a person must be at fault in order to be liable to defensive action. My 
argument was twofold. First, I showed that Thomson and Kamm's view that fault is irrelevant to 
the pennissibility of self-defense is untenable. Second, I endeavored to show that the third 
condition of McMahan's Responsibility Account is too liberal; by divorcing liability from fault, 
it treats the nonnal activities of everyday social life as bases for liability. This is implausible. 
Like McMahan's account, my revised view treats liability as a matter of degree. A person does 
not have to be culpable in order to be liable to defensive action. My view treats liability as a 
matter of degree by treating fault as a matter of degree. In short, liability to defensive action 




Attacker: An individual who initiates a threat against another person through his action. 
Culpable Attacker: An attacker who creates "a forced choice among lives in a way that is neither 
justified nor excused,,23 The culpable attacker intends the threat he poses, is a morally 
responsible agent, and there are no mitigating circumstances, such as duress, that excuse his 
actions. 
Division of the Burden: In some instances, it may be possible for the Victim to "take up the 
slack" or share the burden with her assailant (i.e., the Victim may suffer a broken arm and the 
Attacker a broken leg, rather than one or the other suffering death). The Victim is not normally 
required to take up the slack if the attacker is culpable, but may be required to do so in the case 
of an Innocent Attacker or Threat. This is one way to avoid having to make a choice among 
lives. 
Forced Choice Among Lives: a person creates a situation in which someone must suffer a harm 
(i.e., death). 
Forfeiture: Sometimes the Victim's right of defense is strong enough that her Attacker loses his 
right to counterattack against her.24 
Innocent Attacker: This attacker poses an unjust threat to the Victim. However, because this 
attack is not the result of the attacker's responsible agency, his actions are excused. (An example 
of an Innocent Threat is a person whose coffee has been drugged, rendering him temporarily 
violently psychotic.) 
Innocent Bystander: Bystanders are not causally involved in the threat posed to another person's 
life. There is a strong presumption against killing Bystanders as a means of self-preservation. 
Necessity: Killing in self-defense is the last resort; there is no comparably effective way to avert 
the harm to oneself other than killing in self-defense. 
Nonresponsible Threat: Also referred to as a passive or technical threat, this is a threat ''whose 
mere movements qua physical object or mere presence constitutes a threat to one's life.,,25 As 
the name suggests, nonresponsible threats are not morally responsible for the fact that they 
threaten the life of another. 
23 McMahan, The Ethics ofKilling p. 403 
24 The foregoing terminology is ubiquitous in the literature on self-defense. My discussion draws largely on 
Kamm's Creation and Abortion pp. 45-55, and McMahan's The Ethics ofKilling pp. 401-4. 
25 Davis, p. 190 
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Other-Defense: A third party defends the victim against an Attacker or nonresponsible threat. It 
is usually permissible for a third-party to kill a culpable attacker in defense of the Victim. Third­
parties may also be permitted to help the Victim share the burden with the culpable attacker, the 
innocent attacker, or the nonresponsible threat, though the status of other-defense against 
innocent attackers and nonresponsible threats is controversial.26 
Proportionality: the harm one inflicts in self-defense is proportionate to the harm one thereby 
averts. Every case of self-defense is subject to both the requirements of Proportionality and 
Necessity. (Proportionality and Necessity are also recognized as the Jus ad Bellum requirements 
in just war theory.) 
Retreat: the Victim may be required to flee or back down from a confrontation if she can emerge 
relatively unscathed; this is another way to avoid making a choice among lives. 
Self-Defense: A person commits an act of self-defense when she directs harm at someone who 
threatens to harm her. She may do so by redirecting the harm that threatens her, or by creating a 
distinct harm and directing it at the person who poses the threat.27 
Victim: the person who is threatened by an Attacker or Nonresponsible Threat. 
26 See Davis "Abortion and Self-Defense"
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